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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Samuel J. Davis appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon
his guilty plea to robbery. Davis contends the district court erred in denying his
motion to suppress.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Davis lives in Missouri but had a court hearing in Spokane, Washington,
related to a child custody matter. (See 5/9/15 Tr., p. 10, L. 7 – p. 14, L. 251; R.,
pp. 17-20.) Driving back from Spokane, Davis realized that he did not have
enough money to get back to Missouri. (Id.) Davis stopped in Post Falls and
robbed a Check ‘n Go store at gunpoint. (Id.)
Davis wore a black pull-over, a hoodie and a green cloth over his mouth
and nose. (Id.) When Davis entered the Check ‘n Go he pointed his gun, a
black semi-automatic pistol, at Andrea, the Check ‘n Go cashier. (Id.) Andrea
turned over approximately $885 to Davis. (Id.) Davis fled the scene in his car.
(Id.)
The police had a description of the car used by the robber.

(Id.)

Approximately 36 minutes after the robbery, an Idaho State Trooper stopped a
vehicle matching the description of the robber’s car.
Trooper identified Davis as the driver.

(Id.)

(Id.)

The Idaho State

However, Davis denied ever

stopping in Post Falls. (Id.) The Idaho State Trooper let Davis go. (Id.)

1

The May 9, 2015 interview transcript was admitted as Exhibit 1 to the
suppression hearing. (4/28/16 Tr., p. 19, L. 8 – p. 21, L. 1.)
1

Later investigation of Davis’ cell phone records showed that Davis did stop
in Post Falls. (See R., p. 19.) Based upon Davis’ cell phone records, and
additional investigation, detectives sought and obtained a warrant for Davis’
arrest. (See R., pp. 22-32, 35.) Davis was arrested on the warrant in Missouri
and detectives travelled there to question him. (R., pp. 84-85.)
At the outset of the interview, Detective Uhrig advised Davis of his
2
Miranda rights. (5/9/15 Tr., p. 2, L. 12 – p. 3, L. 5.) Davis said he understood

his rights and he was willing to talk. (Id.)
DETECTIVE UHRIG: Do you understand what I just told you?
MR. DAVIS: Yes.
DETECTIVE UHRIG: Do you have any questions about what I just
told you?
MR. DAVIS: Why am I under arrest.
DETECTIVE UHRIG: Well, right now I want to talk to you about
what’s going on. So, are you willing to talk to me right now?
MR. DAVIS: Yes.
(5/9/15 Tr., p. 2, L. 22 – p. 3, L. 5.)

Detective Uhrig explained they were

investigating the robbery in Post Falls and other robberies in Spokane. (5/9/15
Tr., p. 3, L. 6 – p. 5, L. 15.) The detectives explained they had Davis’ phone
records and knew he was in Post Falls. (Id.) They asked Davis if the Post Falls
Check ‘n Go robbery was a “one-time thing” or if he had committed additional
robberies. (Id.) Davis then stated:
MR. DAVIS: I think I need to talk to a lawyer before I say anything
else. I mean, I want to help you guys out, but I’m not – I got so
2

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2

much on the line. I’m in the Air Force reserves, I got my job at Fed
Ex, I got my kid.
(5/9/15 Tr., p. 5, Ls. 16-20.)
The detective explained that they had enough evidence to arrest Davis for
the robbery and he was going to be extradited back to Idaho, so he “might as
well come clean.” (5/9/15 Tr., p. 6, L. 1 – p. 7, L. 17.) After hearing about the
evidence, Davis asked, “What kind of deal can you give me?” (5/9/15 Tr., p. 7,
Ls. 18-19.) The detectives explained that they could not make any deals, that it
was up to the prosecutor. (5/9/15 Tr., p. 7, L. 20 – p. 9, L. 22.) When Davis
started talking again, the second interrogator interrupted and again asked Davis
if he wanted to talk. (5/9/15 Tr., p. 9, L. 23 – p. 10, L. 6.)
MR. DAVIS: When I left the courthouse –
SECOND INTERROGATOR: Wait. Before you do this, you want
to talk to us; right?
MR. DAVIS: Yeah.
SECOND INTERROGATOR: Okay.
MR. DAVIS: I mean, that’s the only way I got. I mean, I can’t
afford a lawyer. If I get expedited (sic), I’m losing everything and
then some. I’ll never be able to recover, but –
(Id ((“sic”) in original).) The second interrogator then asked Davis to start from
the beginning. (5/9/15 Tr., p. 10, L. 7 – p. 14, L. 25.) Davis then explained that
he did not have enough money to get back to Missouri, so he robbed the Post
Falls Check ‘n Go. (Id.)
The state charged Davis with robbery, burglary and a deadly weapon
enhancement. (R., pp. 49-50.) Davis filed a motion to suppress the statements
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he made to law enforcement. (R., pp. 55-67.) At the hearing on the motion to
suppress, Detective Uhrig testified that he read Davis his Miranda rights and
Davis did not appear to be somebody who was “less capable than the average
person.” (4/28/16 Tr., p. 29, Ls. 2-9.) Detective Uhrig explained:
Q. Did you read him his Miranda rights?
A. I did.
Q. Is that one of the first things you did?
A. Yes.
Q. Can you recall what he said when you read him the Miranda
rights?
A. I do.
Q. What did he say?
A. I asked him if he understood. He said he did. I asked if he had
any questions. He said, Why am I understand [sic] arrest? And I
said, Well, hold on. And I said, Will you talk to me for a moment,
or, Will you talk to me, and he said yes.
(4/28/16 Tr., p. 29, L. 16 – p. 30, L. 3 (capitalization original).) Detective Uhrig
testified that he did not believe Davis unequivocally invoked his rights. (4/28/16
Tr., p. 32, Ls. 3-16.)
Q. What does [Davis] say to you?
A. He said that he thinks he wants to talk to a lawyer, that he
wants to help us out, and he’s got a job and he’s in the Air Force
Reserves and Fed Ex and he’s got a kid.
Q. Okay. And based on your Miranda training, did you think that
that was an indication of somebody’s rights?
A. No.
Q. Why not?
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A. It wasn’t unequivocal. I wasn’t really sure. It was like he was
thinking about what he wanted to do. He didn’t tell me for sure I
want an attorney right here. It was kind of what he was thinking
about.
(4/28/16 Tr., p. 32, Ls. 3-16.)
The district court denied Davis’ motion to suppress. (R., pp. 84-94.) The
district court found that Davis did not unequivocally invoke his right to counsel
and also found that Davis’ confession was voluntary. (Id.) The district court
summarized:
Defendant was read his Miranda warnings and verbally
acknowledged that he understood them. Defendant was asked on
two separate occasions if he wanted to talk about the incident at
issue with detectives and on both occasions he responded “yes.”
Defendant’s statement that “I think I need a lawyer,” followed
immediately by a statement that he wanted to help the detectives
was not an unequivocal invocation of his right to counsel.
Defendant was not interrogated for a lengthy period of time,
Defendant appears to be of at least average intelligence, he was
not deprived of food, water, or breaks, and he was properly given
his Miranda warnings. Defendant’s will was not overborne.
(R., p. 93.)
Davis pled guilty to robbery and the state dismissed the burglary charge
and the deadly weapon enhancement. (R., pp. 95, 96, 98, 107-108.) Davis
reserved the right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress.
(R., pp. 95-96.) The district court entered judgment and sentenced Davis to 10
years with five years fixed. (R., pp. 110-114.) The district court suspended
execution of the sentence and placed Davis on probation for 10 years. (Id.)
Davis timely appealed. (R., pp. 118-121.)

5

ISSUE
Davis states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Davis’s motion to suppress?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 4.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Davis failed to show the district court erred when it denied his motion
to suppress?

6

ARGUMENT
Davis Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred When It Denied His Motion
To Suppress
A.

Introduction
The detectives read Miranda warnings to Davis.

(R., p. 93.)

Davis

acknowledged that he understood those rights, and on two separate occasions
the officers asked Davis if he wanted to talk to them. (Id.) Both times Davis
responded “yes.” (Id.) Davis did not unequivocally request a lawyer. (Id.) Davis
was not interrogated for a lengthy period of time and he was not deprived of
food, water or breaks. (Id.)
On appeal, Davis argues that the district court erred when it determined
that Davis did not unequivocally request a lawyer and that Davis’ confession was
voluntary. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 6-10.) Davis’ arguments fail. The district
court correctly applied the law to the facts in denying Davis’ motion to suppress.
B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a

decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the
trial court’s findings of fact which are supported by substantial evidence, but
freely reviews the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found.
State v. Ballou, 145 Idaho 840, 186 P.3d 696 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing State v.
Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996)).

7

C.

The District Court Correctly Found That Davis Did Not Unequivocally
Invoke His Right To Counsel
To safeguard the privilege against self-incrimination afforded by the Fifth

Amendment to the United States Constitution, the United States Supreme Court
held in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966), that before an
individual is subjected to custodial interrogation, the interrogating officers must
advise the individual of certain rights, including the right to assistance of counsel.
The interrogating officers are only required to cease questioning if the individual
makes a clear and unequivocal request for counsel. See Davis v. United States,
512 U.S. 452, 461-462 (1994); State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848, 852-853, 26 P.3d
31, 35-36 (2001). The United States Supreme Court explained the reasoning
behind the requirement the individual make a clear and unequivocal request for
counsel:
To recapitulate: We held in Miranda that a suspect is entitled to the
assistance of counsel during custodial interrogation even though
the Constitution does not provide for such assistance. We held in
Edwards that if the suspect invokes the right to counsel at any time,
the police must immediately cease questioning him until an
attorney is present. But we are unwilling to create a third layer of
prophylaxis to prevent police questioning when the suspect might
want a lawyer. Unless the suspect actually requests an attorney,
questioning may continue.
Davis, 512 U.S. at 462 (emphasis in original).
In order to effectively invoke the right to counsel, a suspect must
“articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a
reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement
to be a request for an attorney.... If the suspect’s statement is not an
unambiguous or unequivocal request for counsel, the officers have no obligation
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to stop questioning him.” State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 559, 199 P.3d 123,
134 (2008) (quoting Davis, 512 U.S. at 459-62). This “clear articulation” rule also
applies to a defendant’s right to remain silent. Id. (citations omitted).
Here, there is no question that Davis was entitled to the protections of
Miranda because he was in custody when the detectives questioned him. (See
R., p. 85.) Nor is there any question that Davis was advised of his Miranda
rights. (Id.) Therefore, the question before the district court was whether Davis’
statement, “I think I need to talk to a lawyer” constituted a clear and
unambiguous request for counsel. The district court considered the controlling
authority and, after reviewing the video of the interrogation, concluded that
“Nothing in the video demonstrates that Defendant unequivocally invoked his
right to counsel.” (R., pp. 85-91.)
Defendant references several instances contained on a video of
the interrogation that has been provided to the Court and reviewed
by the Court. Nothing in the video demonstrates that Defendant
unequivocally invoked his right to counsel. At best the video
confirms that Defendant was uncertain whether he wanted to
discuss the matter with detectives.
Defendant’s statements
regarding his desire, or lack thereof, to talk with detectives and his
inability to hire private counsel do not constitute an unequivocal
invocation of his right to counsel.
(R., p 90.)
On appeal Davis argues that the district court erred and Davis’ statements
constituted a clear and unequivocal request for counsel. (See Appellant’s brief,
pp. 7-8.) Davis “acknowledges that the Idaho Supreme Court has held that the
phrase ‘I think’ is equivocal.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 7 (citing Payne, 146 Idaho at
559, 199 P.3d at 134).) Davis admits that he prefaced his reference to a lawyer
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with, “I think,” but “[m]indful of this fact, he asserts that the phrase, ‘I think I need
to talk to a lawyer before I say anything else,’ is sufficiently clear that a
reasonable officer in the circumstance would understand it as an invocation of
the right to counsel.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-8.) Davis’ argument fails. Davis
does not cite to any authority to support his claim that his statement “I think I
need to talk to a lawyer,” constituted an unequivocal request for counsel.
Applicable case law supports the district court’s decision.

As Davis

acknowledges, the Idaho Supreme Court has held, “[t]he phrase, ‘I think,’ like the
phrase ‘maybe I should’ is equivocal.” Payne, 146 Idaho at 559, 199 P.3d at 134
(citing Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1070 (9th Cir. 2003)). The Court found
that Payne’s statement, “I don’t think I should answer that” was not a clear
invocation of Payne’s right to remain silent. Id. Other cases are in accord.
Davis, 512 U.S. at 461-462 (“Maybe I should talk to a lawyer” was not an
unequivocal request for counsel); Varie, 135 Idaho at 852–53, 26 P.3d at 35–36
(suspect inquiring if she should have a lawyer present during questioning did not
constitute an unequivocal request for counsel).
Davis’ failure to clearly and unequivocally request counsel is highlighted
when a clear and equivocal request for counsel is examined.

See State v.

Person, 140 Idaho 934, 941, 104 P.3d 976, 983 (Ct. App. 2004). While Person
was being questioned he stated, “[T]his is where I want my lawyer,” and when a
detective asked Person if he wanted to talk to his attorney, Person responded, “I
do.”

See id.

The Idaho Court of Appeals held that Person clearly and

unequivocally invoked his right to counsel. See id. In contrast Davis’ statement,

10

“I think I need to talk to a lawyer,” especially in context that he told the police that
he wanted to “help” them, was not a clear and unequivocal invocation of his right
to counsel. (See 5/9/15 Tr., p. 5, Ls. 16-20.) In addition, shortly thereafter, when
Davis started talking again, the second interrogator interrupted and again
confirmed with Davis that he wanted to talk to the officers. (5/9/15 Tr., p. 9, L. 22
– p. 10, L. 1.)
MR. DAVIS: When I left the courthouse –
SECOND INTERROGATOR: Wait. Before you do this, you want
to talk to us; right?
MR. DAVIS: Yeah.
(Id.) The district court summarized:
It is clear from the record before the Court that Defendant
understood the Miranda warnings and verbally acknowledged that
he understood them. Further, Defendant’s statement that “I think I
need to talk to a lawyer before I say anything else. I mean, I want
to help you guys out, but I’m not, I got so much on the line,” cannot
be considered an unequivocal invocation to his right to counsel or
to his right to remain silent. Defendant urges this Court to
disregard the word “think” and instead find that by using the word
“need” Defendant unequivocally invoked his right to counsel.
However, context matters, and the case law dealing with ambiguity
and equivocation is clear: “I think I need a lawyer,” is not an
unambiguous invocation of the right to counsel. This Court
determines, based on the evidence in the record, Defendant did
not equivocally [sic] invoke his right to counsel or his right to remain
silent.
(R., p. 91.) The district court did not err. The district court properly applied the
applicable law and correctly determined that Davis did not make a clear and
unequivocal request for counsel.
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D.

The District Court Correctly Found That Davis’ Statements To Police
Were Voluntary And Not Coerced
“The use against a criminal defendant of a statement that the defendant

made involuntarily violates the Due Process Clause.” State v. Hays, 159 Idaho
476, 485-486, 362 P.3d 551, 560-61 (Ct. App. 2015) (citing Miller v. Fenton,
474 U.S. 104, 109–10 (1985); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 514–15
(1963); State v. Doe, 131 Idaho 709, 712, 963 P.2d 392, 395 (Ct. App. 1998)).
“The exclusionary rule ‘applies to any confession that was the product of police
coercion, either physical or psychological, or that was otherwise obtained by
methods offensive to due process.’” Id. (citing State v. Doe, 130 Idaho 811, 814,
948 P.2d 166, 169 (Ct. App. 1997)). “In determining whether a statement was
involuntary, the inquiry is whether the defendant’s will was overborne by police
coercion.” Id. (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 286 (1991); Colorado
v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 177 (1986); Doe, 131 Idaho at 713, 963 P.2d at 396;
State v. Davila, 127 Idaho 888, 892, 908 P.2d 581, 585 (Ct. App. 1995)).
“[C]oercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a
confession is not ‘voluntary’ within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.” Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167.

“Indeed, coercive

government misconduct was the catalyst for this Court’s seminal confession
case, Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 56 S.Ct. 461, 80 L.Ed. 682 (1936).”
Connelly, 479 U.S. at 163. “In [Brown], police officers extracted confessions from
the accused through brutal torture.” Id. “[T]he cases considered by th[e] Court”
post-Brown “have focused upon the crucial element of police overreaching.” Id.
at 163-164. “While each confession case has turned on its own set of factors
12

justifying the conclusion that police conduct was oppressive, all have contained a
substantial element of coercive police conduct.”

Id. at 164.

“Absent police

conduct causally related to the confession, there is simply no basis for
concluding that any state actor has deprived a criminal defendant of due process
of law.” Id.
When examining the voluntariness of a confession, a court must look to
the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation, including
the following:
1. Whether Miranda warnings were given;
2. The youth of the accused;
3. The accused’s level of education or low intelligence;
4. The length of the detention;
5. The repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning; and
6. Deprivation of food or sleep.
State v. Troy, 124 Idaho 211, 214, 858 P.2d 750, 753 (1993) (citing Scheckloth
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973); Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S.
341, 348 (1976)).
The district court reviewed the video recording of the interview and utilized
the factors outlined in Troy and determined that Davis’ will was not overborne
and police did not engage in coercive conduct. (See R., pp. 92-93.) On appeal,
Davis argues that he did not fully understand his Miranda rights and that he only
confessed to avoid extradition.

(See Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-10.)

Davis’

argument is not supported by the record, and even if it was, his argument does
not amount to evidence that police coerced his confession and that his will was
overborne.
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Considering the Troy factors, Davis concedes that there is “no evidence
he was deprived of food, water, or sleep, or that he was subject to an
inordinately long interrogation[.]” (Appellant’s brief, p. 9.) Davis’ argument relies
solely upon his single comment regarding his inability to afford a lawyer and his
concern about being extradited.
Detective Uhrig read Davis the Miranda warnings, including, “If you can’t
afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent you before questioning,
if you wish one.” (5/9/15 Tr., p. 2, L. 12 – p. 3, L. 5.) Detective Uhrig asked
Davis if he understood “what I just told you?” and Davis responded, “Yes.” (Id.)
Detective Uhrig then asked Davis if he had any questions about his Miranda
rights. (Id.) Davis wanted to know why he was under arrest. (Id.) Detective
Uhrig then made sure that Davis was willing to talk to him. (Id.) Later, after
again being asked if he wanted to talk to the detectives, Davis indicated that he
could not afford a lawyer and he was concerned about being extradited. (5/9/15
Tr., p. 9, L. 24 – p. 10, L. 6.) The district court found that Davis was of at least
average intelligence and he verbally acknowledged understanding his Miranda
rights. (R., p. 93.) Davis’ sole comment regarding his inability to afford a lawyer
does not establish that he did not understand his Miranda rights. Nor does this
single statement indicate that Davis’ will was overborne or that Detective Uhrig
engaged in any coercive behavior.
Davis’ concern about being extradited did not amount to coercion by the
officers.

Nothing in the record indicates that the officers used the threat of

extradition to coerce a confession out of Davis. As found by the district court:
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Defendant may well have desired to stay in Missouri with his family
and avoid extradition to Idaho. However, detectives never informed
him that he would be allowed to do so. Detectives told Defendant
that they would contact the prosecutor and let him know that
Defendant had been cooperative. [5/9/15 Tr., pp. 6, 9, 32.] It
cannot be said that detectives used this information in any way that
could be construed as coercive. This Court does not find the
conduct of the detectives in this instance to rise to the level of
police coercion to the point where Defendant’s will was overborne.
(R., pp. 92-93.)
Davis fails to cite anything in the record that changes the finding of the
district court. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-10.) Davis “acknowledges that the
detectives never stated they could offer him a deal in which he could avoid
extradition.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 10.) Davis has failed to show the detective
coerced a confession out of him and has failed to show the district court erred.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of the
district court.
DATED this 1st day of May, 2017.
_/s/ Ted S. Tollefson_______
TED S. TOLLEFSON
Deputy Attorney General
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